Friday, February 6, 2015

To truly understand the status of this territory in Greater Israel we have to first differentiate between the personal and the national.


To truly understand the status of this territory in Greater Israel we have to first differentiate between the personal and the national.
Of course there is land privately owned by Arab-Palestinians in
Judea and Samaria, what many call the “West Bank” in seeming deference to the Jordanian occupation, which invented the term as juxtaposition to its eastern bank. These areas, like privately owned territory anywhere in the world, cannot be touched unless there is very pressing reason for a government or sovereign power to do so. These areas, according to Ottoman and British records, constitute no more than a few percent of the total area, meaning the vast majority is not privately owned.
However, to contend that these territories are “Arab-Palestinian” on a national level is problematic. To claim an area belongs to a particular nation requires the territory to have belonged to that people, where they held some sort of sovereignty that was broadly recognized.
All of these criteria have been met historically by the Jewish people, and none by the Arab-Palestinians.
In fact, the Jewish people were provided with national rights in these territories not just by dint of history and past sovereignty, but also by residual legal rights contained in the San Remo Treaty of 1920 and the League of Nations Mandate, which were never canceled and are preserved by the UN Charter, under Article 80 – the famous “Palestine Clause,” that was drafted, in part, to guarantee continuity with respect to Jewish rights from the League of Nations.
For the past almost 2,000 years, since the destruction of Jewish sovereignty and expulsion of most of its indigenous people, it remained an occupied and colonized outpost in the territory of many global and regional empires.
The Ottomans were the most recent to officially apportion the territory, in what they referred to as Ottoman Syria, which today incorporates modern-day Israel, Syria, Jordan and stretching into Iraq. Before The Ottoman Land Code of 1858, land had largely been owned or passed on by word of mouth, custom or tradition. Under the Ottomans of the 19th century, land was apportioned into three main categories: Mulk, Miri and Mawat.
Mulk was the only territory that was privately owned in the common sense of the term, and as stated before, was only a minimal part of the whole territory, much of it owned by Jews, who were given the right to own land under reforms.
Miri was land owned by the sovereign, and individuals could purchase a deed to cultivate this land and pay a tithe to the government. Ownership could be transferred only with the approval of the state. Miri rights could be transferred to heirs, and the land could be sub-let to tenants. In other words, a similar arrangement to a tenant in an apartment or house as having rights in the property, but not to the property.
Finally, Mawat was state or unclaimed land, not owned by private individuals nor largely cultivated. These areas made up almost two-thirds of all territory.
The area recently declared “
State Land” by the Israeli government, a process which has been under an intensive ongoing investigation for many years, is Mawat land. In other words, it has no private status and is not privately owned.
Many claims to the territory suddenly arose during the course of the investigation, but all were proven to be unfounded on the basis of land laws.
Interestingly, it should be clearly understood by those who deem Judea and Samaria “occupied territory” that according to international law the occupying power must use the pre-existing land laws as a basis for claims, exactly as Israel has done in this case, even though Israel’s official position is that it does not see itself de jure as an occupying power in the legal sense of the term. It is only a liberator of its ancestral land.
None of these facts are even alluded to in the many reports surrounding the government’s actions in settlement and housing. This is deeply unjust and a semblance of the relevant background, history and facts would provide the necessary context for what has been converted into an international incident where none should exist.

The most obvious and dangerous cause of conflict and instability in the Middle East is the so-called peace process itself - YJ Draiman




The most obvious and dangerous cause of conflict and instability in the Middle East is the so-called peace process itself

Let me advance an interesting opinion: The most dangerous cause of instability in the Middle East is the so-called peace process itself.
I know this is an unusual point of view. Give me a chance to describe my theory.
By my count, there have been at least 25 major outbursts of violence between Jews and Arab-Palestinians in the
Middle East since 1920.
Every one of these conflicts ended in a similar way. Either outside powers imposed a ceasefire — or else
Israel halted military operations, before the campaign was accomplished and just before a ceasefire could be imposed.
Every one of these conflicts began in a similar way, too: with a renewed attack by the Arab side, or else (as in 1956 or 1967) by Arab violations of the terms of the previous armistice or ceasefire and a blockade in the
Suez Canal.
Think for a minute how unusual this is. Wars usually end when one side or the other decides it cannot continue fighting. The losing side accepts terms it had formerly deemed unacceptable because the alternative — continued fighting — seems even worse. Wherever have you heard the vanquished calling the terms.
I doubt many Hungarians are delighted to have lost more than half their territory to neighbors in
Romania and the former Yugoslavia. The Bolivians still remember the loss of their Pacific coast to Chile in 1884. Some in Indonesia continue to regard East Timor as rightfully theirs.
Yet for the most part, these nations have reconciled themselves to these unwelcome outcomes.
Exactly the opposite has occurred in the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Egypt lost the Sinai Peninsula in 1956, but got it back by pressuring Israel. It lost the Sinai again in 1967, and again recovered it (although this time the right way, after signing a formal peace). I might mention that when Egypt gained its independence, it did not include the Sinai.
Syria lost the Golan in 1967, attacked Israel in 1973, lost again — and still demands the return of the territory.
Arab-Palestinians rejected the 1947 partition, resorted to war, lost, and to this day demand compensation for their losses.
It is like a game of roulette where the management stops the game whenever you begin losing too badly, with promises to refund your money as soon as it conveniently can. What gambler could resist returning to the tables?
I understand why Western governments have acted as they have. They have feared that unless they somehow smooth the situation, the world oil market will be upset and radical ideologies will spread through the Islamic world. Just like the Arab oil embargo of 1973.
What they do not see is that their efforts to contain the problem have in fact aggravated it, and accelerated the hostilities by the Arabs.
Think of this alternative history:
Suppose that the Western world had not intervened in 1949. Suppose the Israeli war of independence had been fought to the bitter end: Arab armies breaking apart and fleeing, as they have in the past, commanders laying down their arms, columns of refugees crossing the
Jordan River.
The 1949 war would have ended not with an armistice, but with a surrender. Arab-Palestinian refugees would have had to settle in new homes, just as the million Jews expelled from their former homes in the Arab lands resettled in
Israel.
The outcome would have squelched any hope that more fighting would have yielded a different result — and the more decisive result might have dissuaded Arab governments from any further attempts to resort to force.
Now Think of another scenario.
In the 1990′s, the former
Yugoslavia erupted into war. New states with new borders were carved out of the old country. Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced. Horrific atrocities were committed. Happily, the conflict end. The displaced adjusted to life in their new homes. Former enemies may still mistrust each other, but violence has faded and seems unlikely to return.
Suppose instead the world had agreed that one of the combatant ethnic groups — the Serbs, say, but it really does not matter — retained a permanent inextinguishable right to reclaim its former homes with all its new offspring’s. Suppose the world agreed to pay displaced persons from that group billions in foreign aid on condition that they never permanently resettled in the territory to which the ethnic group had moved. Suppose the world tolerated Serbian terrorist attacks on
Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo as understandable reactions to injustice. The conflict and violence would continue.
Would there be peace in the former
Yugoslavia today?
The
Middle East peacemakers for the most part act with the highest of intentions and the most exquisite patience. But instead of extinguishing the conflict, they have prolonged it. A peace process intended to insulate the Arab world from the pain of defeat has condemned the Arab world — and the Arab-Palestinian people above all — to an unending war, which is initiated by the Arabs.
Every war must end — and end badly for at least one of the belligerents. It is time for this war to end too, and at last. May the victor be merciful.